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Abstract 
The shareholders’ meeting conventionally is significant in determining the main direction of a company. However, since the 
separation of ‘ownership and control’, retaining the true purpose of having a meeting proves to be challenging. Modifications were 
made to the basic concepts of a meeting in order to meet with the demand of corporate practice. The question is to what extent the 
significant role of a meeting will subsist? This paper aims to address the issue by analysing the concept of a meeting and its 
development. In the end, this paper will reiterate on the importance of having a shareholders’ meeting.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the separation of ‘ownership and control’ (Berle and Means, 1968), and the birth of non-interference rule 
(Automatic Self Cleansing v. Cunningham [1906] 2 Ch. 34), retaining the true purpose of holding such a meeting 
proves to be challenging. As a result, modifications were made to the basic concept and rules relating to meetings, in 
order to meet with the demand of current needs and some of these modifications may jeopardize the true meaning of 
holding the meeting. 
The question is to what extent the significant role of a shareholders’ meeting will subsist? What will be the future 
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of shareholders’ meeting? This paper aims to address the issue by analysing the concept of a meeting and its 
development. The dilemmas and challenges in upholding the original concept and objective of a meeting will be 
examined. In the end, this paper will reiterate on the importance of having a shareholders’ meeting  
 
2. The concept of meeting and shareholders’ meeting 
Either in daily conversation or in law, the word ‘meeting’ carries nothing special but its ordinary meaning, namely 
an assembly of persons. According to the Oxford Advanced Dictionary (1988), ‘meeting’ means a coming together 
of a number of persons at a certain time and place, especially for discussion. The Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), 
defined ‘meeting’ as a gathering of people to discuss or act on matters in which they have a common interest.   
Based on the above literal and legal definitions, there are other important elements embodied in the word ‘meeting’. 
Some of them may be considered, as a direct elements retrieve from the definition while some of them are 
consequential. A ‘meeting’ is an assembly of persons in the presence of others. In other words, meeting requires a 
physical presence of all participants, which is a face-to-face gathering. Persons attending the meeting can see and be 
seen by others. Since it is also a physical presence, they are able to hear and be heard by others. As it is an assembly 
at a particular time and place, meeting is also a real time process. It is to achieve certain goal and usually to make a 
particular decision. Therefore, the participants will come to an agreement on certain issues at the end of the meeting. 
In a formal meeting such as a meeting of an association, identification of all the attendees is essential, in order to 
ensure the eligibility of each attendees to participate in the meeting.   
According to Govilkar (2009), meeting is a foundation for people living together in society. No modern society 
can function well without ‘meeting’.  People meet to discuss and debate either privately or publicly especially when 
the decision may affect every member in the society. Decisions will be made in the meeting by vote of majority. These 
basic principles may be the reason for Govilkar to describe meeting as the backbone of a democracy. Every member 
of the society shall have the right to express their opinion on a particular issue that may affect them either through 
discussion or by voting and if they choose not to participate in the decision-making process, they are aware of such 
matter. Similarly, the philosophy applies to the company’s meetings. A company is a small society, where a group of 
persons (individual or not) get together and do business. Decisions in respect of the company are decided in various 
types of meeting. Shareholders’ meeting is one of them and it denotes an assembly of shareholders having right to 
attend and vote in such meeting. 
The wishes of the shareholders are reflected in the exercise of their voting rights and their voting right is designed 
to encourage directors’ accountability, (Bebchuk, 2005). As such, Proctor and Miles (2003) described the 
shareholders’ meeting as a vehicle to monitor the directors’ conduct. According to Goforth (1994), decisions in respect 
of executive compensation, initiating takeovers and opposing them are among many areas of company’s management 
that have been subjected to substantial abuses to the detriment of the shareholders’ interests. The potential abuses can 
actually be avoided by the shareholders through an open debate and the exercise of voting rights in the shareholders’ 
meeting. Although the power to manage the company stays in the boardroom, decisions with respect to fundamental 
issues including election of directors still remain with the shareholders. In cases where the shareholders are not 
satisfied with the performance or actions taken by the directors, the shareholders can easily remove them by a vote of 
simple majority (ordinary resolution). It may be considered as a powerful and extreme action by the shareholders and 
may create a ‘check and balance’ mechanism within the company. 
However, getting shareholders to actively involve in meeting is no easy task. Attending and participating in 
shareholders’ meeting are rights attached to ownership, but they are optional. There is no duty or obligation for 
shareholders to do so. Everybody seems to have his or her own reasons not to attend the meeting. Retail shareholders 
have little interest to attend and participate in the meeting due to their size of investment. Costs incurred by them in 
attending the meeting will usually be higher as compared to the incentive they will receive. Instead, they may depend 
on the institutional shareholders to play their roles. Nevertheless, the institutional shareholders prefer to ‘vote with 
their feet’ (Proctor and Miles, 2003). The agenda for most of institutional shareholders is purely financial. Their true 
loyalty is actually lies with their beneficiaries or clients with the objective of making profit for them. Intervening into 
mismanagement requires extra resources and yet it will not guarantee a success. Instead of taking a risk, they rather 
put their investment somewhere else. 
Corporate ownership in modern business is another contributing reason for low attendance in shareholders’ 
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meeting. Since the early decades of the 20th century, companies were owned by the increasing number of shareholders 
comprise of individuals and firms (Berle and Means, 1968). These shareholders are no longer confined to a close-
related group of people and firms but widely dispersed and spread across a wider geographical area. As a result, 
attending and participating in shareholders’ meeting become costly, as the shareholders need to bear travelling 
expenses. Attending and participating in the shareholders’ meeting has also become time consuming. The situation 
causes inconvenience on the shareholders and sometimes it is impractical for them to exercise their rights, especially 
if the company is not making profit. They may choose to stay ‘loyal’ to the company and become a ‘free rider’. 
Ultimately, they may choose to ‘exit’ the company as an aggressive reaction to the management of the company. This 
present corporate structure calls for revolution in handling shareholders’ meeting, (Kobler, 1998). 
Another challenge faced by the shareholders’ decision-making is meeting with the demand of current business 
environment. In the present days, time really an essence for success. Many actions require an effective decision-
making process. The traditional way of holding a shareholders’ meeting is regulated by a set of statutory provisions, 
rules and regulations. The process of the meeting basically can be divided into three phases, namely pre-meeting, the 
day of the meeting and post meeting. A notice calling for such a meeting needs to be served within certain period of 
time as required by law. Venue for meeting needs to be fixed and there are various pre-meeting as well as post-meeting 
paperwork to be prepared. The whole process may be laborious, costly and time consuming, that may be considered 
as impractical for certain cases especially for small companies. If the directors are also the shareholders in the 
company, the question is why do the company have to undergo all the hurdles of holding a meeting?  
These are the real issues raised from a perspective of corporate practice that call for a revamp in the concept of 
shareholders’ meeting. In order to survive in the modern business environment, shareholders’ meeting has to be seen 
from a broader perspective, so as to uphold its significant role in the company. In addition, modifications to the 
traditional concept of shareholders’ meeting are inevitable as modern business environment needs for a convenient 
way to make decisions. 
3. The role of shareholders’ meeting: reconsidered 
Overcoming the complex issue in modern business requires a self-regulatory compliance beyond a mere 
enforcement of statutory provisions by the authority concerned.  The pressure for compliance must come from within 
the company itself. As the directors manage the affairs of the company, the most suitable candidate for this task must 
be the shareholders, acting collectively through the meeting. With the persuasive power of the ‘owner’, directors will 
be compelled to act prudently in accordance with the statutory and non-statutory regulations. Shareholders’ meeting 
is not to be held as a mere formality but to be treated as a productive assembly. Shareholders’ meeting should be used 
in a broader perspective to promote good governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
It is true that shareholders’ participation may cause a drawback in any effort to enhance the role of the shareholders’ 
meeting but there is a hope for betterment. Shareholders are indeed widely dispersed as documented in Berle and 
Means’ work; hence to get the shareholders together is a daunting task. However, it is best to note that since 1960s 
there is a slight change in ownership trend. There has been a partial concentration of shareholdings into the hands of 
institutional shareholders especially pension funds and insurance companies (Davies and Worthington, 2012). The 
scenario has a significant implication in terms of the ability and perhaps willingness of shareholders to exercise their 
rights conferred to them by law companies (Davies and Worthington, 2012). Definitely there will be some institutional 
shareholders who will refuse to take active part in the meeting. Nonetheless, the future is more promising judging 
from the growing involvement of institutional shareholders in shareholder activism. 
3.1 Shareholders’ Meeting and the Promotion of Good Governance 
Since the economic hardship occurred in the end of the 20th century, corporate governance became the crucial 
issue among corporate players. Promoting best practices of governance has become one of the most important agenda 
in corporate world. Laws have been enacted, rules have been regulated and best practices with code of conducts have 
been formulated to ensure accountability among those in the company’s management. However, in promoting good 
corporate governance within the company, the key player should be the body of shareholders who have direct interests 
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in the company. It has been argued that in addressing any complex problem of corporate governance would require 
amongst others the revival of shareholders’ involvement in the company’s decision-making. (Mohammad Rizal Salim 
and Yee Shyun Ong, 2009). It is simply because, in discharging their duties, directors are held accountable for their 
decisions by the shareholders through their legal right to appoint and remove the directors. According to the Australian 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Report (2008), shareholders’ engagement and 
participation that contribute to good corporate governance has two main features. First, is effective communication 
and second is effective exercise of voting entitlement. 
Communication and transfer of information from the management to the shareholders are among many aspects of 
corporate governance. One of the purposes of holding a shareholders’ meeting is for shareholders to gain information 
about the company. Principle 8 of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2012) for instance, emphasizes that 
the directors should utilize this event especially through Annual General Meeting (AGM) to improve communication 
with the shareholders. During the shareholders’ meeting, shareholders are allowed to ask questions and request for 
explanation. They may express their opinions in any matter regarding the company. At the same time, information 
will be passed over to the shareholders through circulation of documents. An active involvement by the shareholders 
in gathering information will irreversibly lead to well-informed resolutions. For this reason, shareholders’ meeting 
may serves as a viable vehicle to promote corporate governance (Mohammad Rizal Salim and Yee Shyun Ong, 2009).  
In the meantime, voting right is considered as an important power conferred upon shareholders (Chan and Koh, 
2006). It is a right; where shareholders express their final say in any matters put before them, including the fate of 
each director in the management team. Voting right can either be exercised by shareholders present in person or it can 
also be delegated to proxy. Hence, effective exercise of voting right by the shareholders or their proxies will leads to 
an effective monitory body against the managerial power of the directors (Proctor and Miles, 2003). Undoubtedly, the 
shareholders hold limited powers in their attempt to balance the management powers of directors (Daniel, 2010). Still, 
those powers can make a lot of differences. For instance recently, the Economic Times reported that in Mumbai India, 
a surprise defeat of Tata Motors’ resolutions to ratify the salary of three top executives was triggered by greater 
participation by shareholders.  The increasing number of participation among shareholders (institutional and 
individuals) is an alarm bell for other companies on the actual power of shareholders if they choose to act in concert 
(the Economic Times, 12 July 2014). 
 
3.2 Shareholders’ Meeting and the CSR Agenda 
As companies look to broaden their approach to governance beyond financial responsibilities, directors must 
consider the impact of every decision they make on their companies especially to shareholders, but not neglecting 
other stakeholders as well. Companies do not exist by themselves in this world. Employees, consumers, public at large 
and even the environment, may be the outsider to the company but sometimes, the company’s activities will affect 
them the most. As part of the society, the welfare of others has to be taken into consideration. This is known as 
corporate social responsibility or corporate responsibility. However, CSR agenda usually does not have direct legal 
backing,.  It needs an alternative way to enforce it and shareholders’ meeting may be the appropriate place to do so. 
Although the social responsibility theorists are less supportive of shareholders’ rights (Velasco, 2006), the exercise 
of those rights, may help to endorse the agenda. Bottomley (2010) suggested that as part of a company, shareholders 
can act as a responsible agent for the company. Shareholders as the ‘owner’ have the capabilities to make sure that in 
any of the company’s operation, the interests of these ‘outsiders’ are taken into account as well. As an example, 
Pensions Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) in United Kingdom (UK) lodged a shareholders’ resolution to 
address Shell’s human rights and environmental policies before its 1997’s AGM. This followed after months of 
discussions with Shell’s directors. By the time the AGM took place, Shell has positively responded to many of the 
issues raised (Proctor and Miles, 2003). Clearly, considering the outsider’s interests may cause profit reduction, 
nonetheless it will help company’s long-term sustainability and long-term profit. The issue on corporate social 
responsibility can be treated as a long-term business strategy and the shareholders in a general meeting can initiate 
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4. Revolutionised concept of shareholders’ meeting  
The important role of shareholders’ meeting may only be established if the meeting can accommodate the busy 
lifestyle of present corporate society. Time is an essence and for that, actions need to be taken at greater speed. As 
such, the decision-making process needs to be simplified. In doing so, the concept of a meeting has to be flexible, so 
that a valid resolution may be passed even if the element of a meeting in its ordinary meaning is compromised. The 
following discussion will demonstrate that in developing legal principles to be contemporary, the process of 
modifications to the traditional view is inevitable. However, every change will surely have positive and negative 
effects that need to be balanced with care, so as to ensure that changes will not defeat the original purpose of 
facilitating the exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
 
4.1 The unanimous consent and ‘paper meeting’ 
Based on previous literatures, it is contended here that the principles of unanimous consent is the earliest form of 
modifications made to the concept of ‘meeting’.  The basis of this principle derived from the judgment of Lord Darvey 
in the celebrated case of Solomon v Solomon Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 that ‘… the company is bound in a matter intra 
vires by the unanimous agreement of its members’ (at page 57). Cotton LJ in the case of Baroness Wenlock v River 
Dee Co (1995) 36 ChD 675  expressed that the court will not deny the existence of a resolution on a particular matter, 
if all the shareholders have expressly assented to the matter. This principle was later developed in the case of Re 
Express Engineering Works Ltd. [1920] 1 Ch 466. A board of directors’ decision was treated as a resolution passed in 
a shareholders’ meeting as all five directors were also the only shareholders in the company. The clearest statement 
of this principle can be found in the case of Re Duomatic Ltd. [1969] 2 Ch 356. Buckley J stated that where all 
shareholders having the right to attend and vote in the meeting have given their assent to a particular matter, the assent 
is as good as a resolution passed in a shareholders’ meeting (at page 373). 
The principle of unanimous consent is basically about having the shareholders’ decision without having a formal 
meeting. This principle is practical especially for small companies where the directors are also the only shareholders 
in the company. According to this principle, if all the shareholders having the right to attend and vote in an actual 
shareholders’ meeting, give their consent to a particular matter, the consent may be treated as a resolution duly passed 
in a shareholders’ meeting. However, there are a few conditions need to be satisfied, in applying for this principle. 
First and foremost, all shareholders must give their assent to the matter. The assent must be actual and not based on 
inferences or assumption that the shareholders will agree to the matter if they have been consulted. The assent must 
be given based on knowledge on the matter or in other words an informed consent. Secondly, the matter involved 
must not be something which is ultra vires or beyond the power of a shareholders’ meeting to carry out. This principle 
is actually setting aside all the understanding on the concept of a meeting but retaining only the purpose of holding a 
meeting, which is to transact business and eventually pass a resolution. 
The underlying principle of unanimous consent leads to the birth of another corporate practice namely circular 
resolution. Under this practice, a proposed resolution will be circulated to all shareholders for their consent. Once all 
shareholders gave their assent, a resolution is deemed passed as if it has been passed in a duly convene shareholders’ 
meeting. This practice is also known as ‘paper meeting’ (Wong Kim Fatt, 2001). Although both the principle of 
unanimous consent and circular resolution are similar but there are two distinctive features that separate these two. 
First, the principle of unanimous consent is a Common Law principles based on cases. Meanwhile, circular resolution 
is a practice empowered by statutory provision. Another distinction between these two is the form of assent given by 
the shareholders. Under the principle of unanimous consent, there is no requirement whether the assent should be in 
writing or not. In the meantime, shareholders’ consent in circular resolution must be reduced in writing. In simple 
understanding, a shareholder’s consent needs to be proven by his signature. 
 
4.2 The electronic shareholders’ meeting 
The inconveniences in attending meeting caused by modern shareholdings structure may be overcome by the 
advancement in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT). It offers a borderless world, where people 
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may meet without having to actually be in one place. ICT may also help the shareholders as well as the company to 
reduce costs. Shareholders will not have to bear extra travelling expenses. Companies may save money through 
allocation for printing and circulating documents for a meeting, if the documents are served through electronic 
transmission. In addition, technology may provide a platform for an effective deliberation. Internet for instance, has 
hypertext/hypermedia technology. This facility could make a presentation of potential complex materials more 
interesting to the relatively unsophisticated shareholders, by using graphics, sounds and video. More importantly, 
electronic communication may encourage shareholders to cast their vote personally rather than depending on proxies 
(Boros, 1999). 
Applying technology in handling the shareholders’ meeting is not merely having the appropriate equipment and 
facilities but it also requires a flexible concept of ‘meeting’. ‘Meeting’ cannot remain in its usual literal meaning or it 
may not accommodate the use of ICT in modern business environment. As such, the traditional view on what 
constitutes a valid meeting has been expended. This liberal approach is known as the concept of ‘creative 
interpretation’ (Chaaandratre, 2009). In the case of Byng v. London Life Assurance [1990] 1 Ch 170, a general meeting 
of London Life Assurance was held in few separate rooms connected by electronic audio-visual aid. The meeting was 
held as a valid meeting.  Physical presence in the same place is no longer an essential element to prove that there is a 
valid meeting. Shareholders from remote location may attend and participate in the meeting by adopting the concept 
of ‘virtual presence’ (Natale, 2002).  In Wagner v International Health Promotions (1994) 5 ACSR 419, a radical 
interpretation was made by Santow J where ‘meeting’ is focused on a meeting of mind and not of bodies (at page 421 
– 422). 
Since there was a positive sign from the bench on the broader definition of the word ‘meeting’ and a promising 
better attendance in the meeting, the use of technology has been given a statutory recognition in many countries. Any 
type of technology is permissible to be used in handling a shareholders’ meeting, as long as it offers the shareholders 
opportunity to participate in the meeting. In a few jurisdictions such as Delaware USA, a shareholders’ meeting may 
even be held without any location, solely by remote communication or also known as virtual shareholders’ meeting. 
Though in reality, only a few companies had actually taken the benefit from this development (Fairfax, 2009), but it 
is too early to decide whether an electronic shareholders’ meeting will be welcome by the corporate society. Looking 
at the increasing obsession to ICT gadgets and services among public, a widespread occurrence of electronic meeting 
in the forthcoming decades is highly possible.  
 
4.3 The dispensation of AGM for private companies 
As a result of corporate law reform programmes carried out by many countries, the position of AGM as an important 
event in the companies’ calendar has been modified. The requirement to hold an AGM is confined to public companies 
only. A private company is no longer required to hold an AGM. Division 8 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
for instance, listed out provisions on AGM specifically for public companies only. Part 13 Chapter 4 of the Companies 
Act 2006 (UK) also has the similar effect. This is considered as ‘the most radical change in this area of law since 
1862’ (Kosmin and Roberts, 2008), but less cumbersome (Davies and Worthington, 2012) to small companies. 
Nevertheless, the private companies may still hold AGM if they wish to do so or if their articles required them to do 
so. There may be a number of possible reasons for these changes. Private companies will no longer be burdened with 
administrative works in holding the AGM. Costs incurred by those companies may also be saved.  Companies where 
all shareholders are also directors will obviously enjoy the benefit of this reform. As for others, issues on minority 
shareholders’ rights remain the main concern. 
 
4.4 Challenges 
It has been demonstrated above, modifications to the traditional concept of a shareholders’ meeting are necessary 
and it helps the shareholders as well as the company in many ways. Decisions may be made without a physically 
attended meeting by the shareholders. Signing circulars may pass resolutions. Meeting may be held in separate rooms, 
separate locations or even without any physical location. Shareholders will no longer have to bear travelling expenses. 
Companies will no longer have to spend unnecessary costs. Private companies may use their usual allocation of 
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resources for AGM, on expending their business. It is a flexible way of holding a modern shareholders’ meeting and 
it offers a convenience way to attend and participate in such meeting. Shareholders’ role in the company can only be 
effective if they take part in the decision-making process. Hence, this modernised concept of shareholders’ meeting 
is the awaited solution for shareholders’ passivism. The success of shareholders in blocking Tata Motors’ resolution 
(mentioned above), was said a possible result of mandatory electronic voting imposed by the Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs, proving that shareholders may make a difference if they are assisted in exercising their right. 
Meanwhile, it is also prudent for us to consider that, departing away from the ordinary meaning of a meeting means 
compromising a fundamental purpose of attending a meeting. Shareholders’ meeting in particular the AGM may be 
the only chance for shareholders to meet and have a direct dialogue with the directors. This is especially the case for 
retail shareholders. ’Paper Meeting’, electronic meeting and foremost the dispensation of private companies from 
holding the AGM, enables directors to evade a face-to-face confrontation with the shareholders. Even if in a physical 
meeting, directors may turn off the microphone and refuse to answer the shareholders, but at least they can never chase 
away shareholders from the meeting. On the other hand in remote meeting, everything will be under the director’s 
control (Kane, 2002). Dismissing shareholders will be much easier.  
Cost is not absolutely in favour of electronic shareholders’ meeting. Though costs incurred by shareholders to 
exercise their rights may be reduced but establishing proper facilities to make it works is not so cheap. In addition to 
physical equipment, a significant number of human resources are needed to ensure the smoothness of such meeting. 
Beuthel (2006), in his study concluded that, in short terms, companies which choose to use online voting and meetings 
will face with more works and higher costs. Unless the attendees are huge in numbers, the returns will not be 
encouraging and it will be at the expense of the company. The use of technology in organising shareholders’ meeting 
is not merely about being trendy but requires a proper planning with due consideration of many factors. 
Dispensation of private companies from holding the AGM is a relief for small companies. The amended 
requirement really is beneficial for companies where directors are also the only shareholders. On the contrary, it is 
best to remember that not all private companies are to be considered as ‘small’. Some of them are no different than a 
public company; except that their shareholders are below the maximum number fixed by the law (most countries set 
a maximum number of shareholders of a private company at 50).  If the ordinary businesses of the AGM are to be 
passed through the ‘paper meeting’, how do we make sure that the shareholders’ rights for information has been 
properly maintained? Approving the financial statement for instance needs for deliberation and a real time debate 
session, then only the integrity of such report may be determined. The new rule simply takes away the requirement 
without considering a possibility that a private company may not always be so ‘small’. It is suggested here that, the 
term ‘private companies’ for the purpose of AGM be redefined and the waiver of AGM should only be encouraged to 
directors/shareholders type of company. 
5. Conclusion 
In the changing environment of corporate world, the concept of meeting needs to evolve. The traditional definitions 
of a meeting need to be expended in order to provide a flexible platform for shareholders to meet and pass resolution. 
From the early years of the 20th century until to date, there are number of modifications have been made to the 
ordinary meaning of a ‘meeting’. Under the modified rules of a meeting, physical presence of all the shareholders is 
no longer a requirement to constitute a valid meeting. A formal meeting is no longer required to pass a resolution. All 
of these modifications emerged into corporate practice with purposes to simplify and expedite the decision-making 
process, as well as to facilitate the shareholders in exercising their right to speak and vote in the meeting. It is important 
now to provide a sensible avenue for shareholders to participate in making decisions as shareholders’ meeting has a 
bigger role in modern business. Although the shareholders enjoy restricted powers, there was proven success that 
shareholders acting collectively through meetings may cause pressure to directors and even making the directors’ 
proposal a nose-dive attempt. 
Efforts to encourage shareholders’ commitment in decision-making and preservation of shareholders’ rights have 
become a crucial issue. The extended concept of shareholders’ meeting causes disadvantages to shareholders as well 
when certain elements of a valid meeting are being modified. The concept of ‘virtual presence’ for instance, clearly 
set aside the importance of face-to-face dialogue. Similarly, the dispensation of private companies to hold AGM is 
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not only removing a physical gathering but leave behind the importance of holding the AGM completely. 
Shareholders’ meeting may have been treated as a ‘waste of time and resources’ but the power of ‘ownership’ is 
actually more forceful compared to any statutory enforcement, which is desperately needed in our current business 
environment. Therefore, any future modification to the concept, laws, rules and regulations in respect of the 
shareholders’ meeting should not abandon completely the true objective of a meeting and the significant role of it in 
the company.  
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